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Evidence-Self Incrimination-Admissibility of Compulsory
Voice Identification
In a recent South Carolina case1 the defendant was accused of com-
mitting rape. Before trial he was compelled by the sheriff to repeat
certain words which the rapist had spoken at the time of the crime. The
prosecutrix immediately identified the accused by his voice as the rapist.
Testimony as to this identification was admitted at trial, and the de-
fendant was convicted. On appeal the court held that admission of this
testimony was error, since it violated the defendant's constitutional
guaranty2 not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Historically 3 the privilege of a person not to be compelled to testify
or give evidence against himself in a criminal case developed as a
safeguard against the obtaining of testimony from the accused through
inquisition and torture in the ecclesiastical courts and the Court of
Star Chamber in England. It later became a doctrine of the common
law courts, and is now guaranteed in the United States Constitution,
4
the North Carolina Constitution,5 and the constitutions of all but two
of the remaining states.0 North Carolina7 and nearly all other states
also have statutes which restate the guaranty in statutory form.8 The
wording of the privilege varies among the states, but this does not
affect the scope or application of the privilege. 9
While there has been some criticism of the privilege,' 0 there are still
valid reasons for retaining it. It forces a more diligent search for
extrinsic evidence and provides protection against overzealous officers
and district attorneys." The privilege furnishes no protection against
testimony which is voluntarily given,12 or testimony which is merely
degrading rather than actually incriminating.' 3 It does apply to com-
' State v. Taylor, 49 S. E. 2d 289 (S. C. 1948).
* S. C. CONST. Art. I, §17: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
'For a comprehensive history of the privilege see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2250
(3d ed. 1940).
'U. S. CONST. AMEND. V: "No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
N. C. CONST. Art. I, §11: "In all criminal prosecutions every man has the
right to ... not be compelled to give evidence against himself."
I Iowa and New Jersey. But both of these states now provide for the privilege
by statute. IowA CODE §622.14 (1946) ; N. 3. STAT. ANN. §§2:97-6, 7 (1939).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §8-54 (1943).
'8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §2252 n. 3 (3d ed. 1940).
' Councelman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1871) ; 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §324
(3d ed. 1940) ("The detailed rules are to be determined by the historical and
logical requirements of the principle, regardless of the particular words of a
particular constitution.").
108 WIGOORE, EVIDENCE §2251 (3d ed. 1940).
"Ibid.
"State v. Farrell, 223 N. C. 804, 28 S. E. 2d 560 (1944); State v. Simpson,
133 N. C. 676, 45 S. E. 567 (1903).23 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2255 (3d ed. 1940).
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pulsory production of incriminating papers,' 4 and to facts which tend
to incriminate as well as those which amount to a direct admission of
guilt.15
The question of the admissibility of compulsory voice identification
raised by the Taylor case has never been considered by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, and only two other jurisdictions besides South
Carolina have considered it. In an early Pennsylvania case 6 the court
said by way of dictum that such evidence would not violate the privi-
lege against self-incrimination and should be admitted. In a later Texas
case17 the court held in a direct ruling that compulsory voice identifica-
tion violated the privilege and was not admissible.
In reaching its decision in the instant case the court relied on and
followed the previous South Carolina case of State v. Griffin'8 which
held that compelling an accused person to place her foot in a footprint
found at the scene of the crime was a violation of the constitutional
privilege and evidence of the comparison was not admissible. The court
said, "It is difficult to draw any distinction between compelling a de-
fendant to put his foot in a track at the scene of the crime in order to
afford a basis for comparison and requiring a defendant to repeat certain
words used at the scene of the crime in order to establish a basis for
identity."'0  The decision assumes, without deciding, that if the accused
had merely been compelled to speak without any compulsion as to sub-
ject or words used, such testimony would have been admissible.20 The
questions raised by this decision, therefore, are whether a person may
be compelled to give up evidence about his body and person without
violating his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and
whether compulsory voice identification is evidence within this category.
There is great confusion in the cases.2' The minority decisions hold
14 State v. Hollingsworth, 191 N. C. 595, 132 S. E. 667 (1926).
Smith v. Smith, 116 N. C. 386, 21 S. E. 196 (1895).
1' See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369, 395, 9Atl. 78, 81 (1887).
" Beachem v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. Rep. 272, 162 S. W. 2d 706 (1942). The
decision makes the same distinction which is suggested in the Taylor case, that
had there been no compulsion as to subject or particular words spoken, the testi-
mony would have been admissible. The court also relied upon a Texas statute
which provided that a confession of an accused person shall not be used against
him if obtained while he is in jail or custody, unless it is in writing and after
a proper warning.16129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81 (1924).
10 State v. Taylor, 49 S. E. 289, 292 (S. C. 1948).
.0 This distinction does not appear to be valid. If the voice identification is
admissible at all, compelling the accused to repeat the exact words which had
been heard would only make the identification more accurate. In State v. Neville,
175 N. C. 731, 95 S. E. 55 (1918), which admitted evidence that the accused was
compelled to go to the scene of the crime and stand in a position where the
criminal had been seen, the court said, "It was fairer to present him to her amid
the surroundings where the occurrence took place."
2'8 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE §2265 n. 2 (3d ed. 1940). See Note, 171 A. L. R.
1144 (1947).
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that the privilege should be broadly construed to cover any compulsory
actions of the accused, 22 while the majority of jurisdictions construe the
privilege more strictly and hold that physical evidence about the body
of the accused should not be within the privilege.
In the early case of State v. Jacobs,23 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that compelling a defendant to exhibit himself to the in-
spection of the jury for the purpose of enabling them to determine his
status as a free Negro was a violation of the privilege. This case has
not been overruled by the court, but has been distinguished 24 and has
never been followed. The decision has been criticized by writers25 and
in decisions of other jurisdictions.2  Since the Jacobs case, however,
North Carolina has consistently followed the more modern view and
admitted evidence produced by compulsory physical actions of the
accused.27
Application of the minority view, which construes the privilege as
applying to any evidence obtained by compulsion, has reached some
extreme results. It has been held that a person cannot be compelled to
stand up in court to be identified by his accuser ;28 that he cannot be
compelled to try on a coat29 or hat3" found at the scene of the crime to
determine if it fits; and that he cannot be compelled to place his foot
in a track for comparison and identification.3 ' Holding that this type
of compulsory evidence should not be admissible appears to be an ex-
" Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 224, 27 So. 2d 186, 193 (1946) ("A person in
this state cannot be required against his will to do any positive act tending to
operate as evidence against himself in a criminal case.").23 50 N. C. 259 (1858).
2 State v. Johnson, 67 N. C. 55 (1872) (the distinction made is that in exhibit-
ing himself to the prosecuting witness rather than the jury, it is testimony of the
witness and not the accused which is admitted) ; State v. Vincent, 222 N. C. 543,
23 S. E. 2d 832 (1943).
" STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §57 n. 12 (1946); Inbau, Self-
incrimination-What Canz an Accused Person Be Compelled to Do?, 28 J. CRILX.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 261, 272 (1938).
28 State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 530 (1879).
2 State v. Johnson, 67 N. C. 55 (1872) (defendant required to stand up during
trial for prosecuting witness to identify him) ; State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646
(1876) (defendant compelled to place foot in track for comparison); State v.
Thompson, 161 N. C. 238, 76 S. E. 249 (1912) (defendant required to aim gun
through a window at the scene of the crime to see if he was the proper height
to have fired the shot) ; State v. Neville, 175 N. C. 731, 95 S. E. 55 (1918)
(defendant compelled to go to the scene of the crime and stand in the position
the person committing the crime had been seen in) ; State v. Bazemore, 193 N. C.
336, 137 S. E. 172 (1927) (defendant compelled to place a hat on his head in a
particular way) ; State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85 (1874) (witness compelled to unwrap
her bandaged hand to show whether or not it was burned). See also 5 N. C. L.
REv. 333 (1927).28 Smith v. State, 247 Ala. 354, 24 So. 2d 546 (1946).
29 Ward v. State, 27 Okla. Cr. R. 362, 228 Pac. 498 (1924).
20 Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A. 2d 820 (1944).
Cooper v. State, 86 Ala. 610, 6 So. 110 (1889) : Elder v. State, 143 Ga. 363,
85 S. E. 97 (1915) ; State v. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81 (1924).
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travagant extension of the constitutional privilege,82 and would tend to
protect the guilty and hamper the search for the truth.
The strict interpretation followed by North Carolina and the major-
ity of other jurisdictions appears to be the better reasoned and more
practical view. It restricts application of the privilege to testimonial
compulsion rather than any and every compulsion of the accused. The
distinction is clearly stated by Professor Wigmore, who says, "Unless
some attempt is made to secure a communication, written or oral, upon
which reliance is to be placed as involving his consciousness of the facts
and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon
him is not testimonial. '33
Evidence as to physical characteristics of the accused which he is
compelled to furnish for use as identification data is not considered as
making him furnish evidence against himself. It is dependent upon
physical facts and conditions, and does not depend upon confessions,
admissions, or statements of the accused.34 Such evidence cannot be
influenced by compulsion or fear of punishment. "It is called by the
civilians 'real evidence,' is always admissible, and is of greater or less
value according to the circumstances." 3 5
Compulsory voice identification is on the borderline between com-
pulsion of identification data about the body of the accused and testi-
monial compulsion.3 6 But it is submitted that proper application of the
North Carolina and majority reasoning to the instant case would result
in a ruling contrary to that handed down by the South Carolina court.
There was no testimonial compulsion of the accused. He was merely
compelled to furnish a sample of his voice for comparison and identifica-
tion, and the words conveyed no communication or conscious meaning
as to the crime or the accused's possible connection with it. The only
use made of the words spoken was to compare the quality, pitch, or
accent of the voice of the accused with the voice the prosecutrix had
heard at the scene of the crime. In this respect the voice was merely
a physical characteristic of the accused, such as the size and shape of
his foot, hand, or body, his facial features, his fingerprints, or a scar
or mark on his body. The resemblance between the voice of the accused
3 Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245 (1910).
118 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §375 (3d ed. 1940) ; in Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245,
252 (1910) Mr. Justice Holmes said, "The prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material."
"' State v. Thompson, 161 N. C. 238, 76 S. E. 249 (1912).
"s State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646, 647 (1876).
" Another borderline situation which is analogous to compulsory voice identifi-
cation is one where the accused is compelled to furnish a sample of his hand-
writing for identification. In Hartzell v. U. S., 72 F. 2d 569 (C. C. A. 8th 1934)
the court admitted such evidence and said that it was similar to being present in
court and being identified. Contra: Bertran v. Samson, 53 P. I. 570 (1929).
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when compelled to speak 37 and the voice heard at the time the rape was
-committed should not be excluded as a violation of the privilege against
self incrimination. It should be admitted as a fact calculated to aid the
jury in discovering the truth, the correctness of the identification going
to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence.38
LERoY F. FULLER.
Labor Law-Unfair Labor Practices-Employer By-passing
Designated Bargaining Agent
An employer, after having bargained to an impasse with the certified
representative of the employees, submitted his final proposal directly to
strikers individually by mail, requesting them to vote on a ballot pro-
vided as to whether they would be willing to return to work upon the
terms proposed by the employer but rejected by the union. The National
Labor Relations Board found' that the employer interfered with the
rights of the employees to bargain collectively within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (1)2 of the National Labor Relations Act. Upon petition
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for enforcement
of the order, it was held that the evidence did not justify a finding of
an unfair labor practice because: (1) the letter disclosed no effort to
bargain with the employees individually; (2) the employer had evi-
denced his good faith in dealing with the union; and (3) the employer
" No power of compulsion beyond that ordinarily permitted in obtaining testi-
mony should be allowed. The powers of compelling testimony are discussed in 8
WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2195 (3d ed. 1940). If the accused refuses to repeat the
words, testimony as to this refusal would be competent. State v. Graham, 74
N. C. 646 (1876).
" The question of admissibility of voice identification on grounds other than
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination is beyond the scope of this
mnote. Proper safeguards should be taken to prevent inducement or suggestion
of the identification. The accused should be presented in company with others
who are similar in appearance. This procedure was followed in the instant case.
-3 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§786, 786a (1946). In general such identification is ad-
missible, its probative value to be a question for the jury. Riner v. State, 128
Fla. 848, 176 So. 38 (1937); Fussell v. State, 93 Ga. 450, 21 S. E. 97 (1895);
-Commonwealth v. Wifiliams, 105 Mass. 67 (1870); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §660
(3d ed. 1940) ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVImENcE, §96 (1946).
' Penokee Veneer Co., 74 N. L. R. B. 1683 (1947).
249 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158(1) (1946), as amended by National
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. §158(a) (1) (Supp.
1947): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7." Sec. 7 provides, "Employees shall have the right to self organization,
- to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section
_ 8(a) (3)."
